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The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI)—a joint research center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute
at Columbia University—explores elements of the international investment legal framework, including the impact of investment
treaties, investor–state dispute settlement, and home and host government policies governing inward and outward investment,
among many other issues.
1

Existing investment treaties do not and cannot advance climate goals. There is a fundamental misalignment
between the existing international investment regime—including its centerpiece: investor–state arbitration—and
the actions needed to meet the objectives of the international climate regime and avoid catastrophic climate
change. For international investment law to support climate goals, we need a wholly new regime for investment
governance, not investment protection and arbitration.1

2

Investment is crucial to achieving climate mitigation and adaptation goals. We need substantially more
investment in zero-carbon sectors, such as renewable power generation (solar, wind, hydropower, and
geothermal), batteries and other energy storage technologies, green hydrogen, electric transportation, and
energy efficiency, while phasing out investment in fossil fuels and other high-emission economic activities. The
2022 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability also
stresses that investments in mitigation must be coupled with investment in adaptation and climate-resilient
infrastructure to help billions in areas of growing climate risk. 2

3

International investment law should accelerate climate-friendly, sustainable investment and the phase-out of
climate-unfriendly investment. Existing investment treaties and investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) fail to
do either. They were not designed to advance those goals, but to protect economic interests of foreign
investors and their investments, regardless of their climate friendliness.
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This submission is based on Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Climate Action Needs Investment Governance, Not Investment Protection and
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The Clashing Climate Change and Investment Regimes: Back to the 1990s
4

The 2015 Paris Agreement’s umbrella treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994—a landmark moment that emphasized the
need for long-term planning for a climate-friendly future. Its ultimate objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.” 3

5

In a 1994 report—months before the first Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC—the IPCC indicated
that “the main anthropogenic sources of [carbon dioxide] are the burning of fossil fuels [among others].” The
same report also estimated a carbon budget, which indicated the amount of greenhouse gases we could,
starting in 1994, still emit while stabilizing concentrations at safe levels. The report stressed that “stabilization
[of greenhouse gas concentrations] is only possible if emissions are […] reduced well below 1990 levels.” 4

6

The international community—including states as well as investors—has been on notice since the 1990s: to
prevent disastrous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere must be stabilized. To do that, emissions must be reduced well below 1990 levels, which requires
transitioning away from fossil energy. Yet emissions have since increased substantially as states and investors
have been too slow in adjusting course.
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If fossil energy companies have any “legitimate expectation” since the 1990s, it is that states would take steps
to phase out their sector. In the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) pathway to net-zero by 2050, 5 “there is no
need for investment in new fossil fuel supply”: “Beyond projects already committed as of 2021, there are no
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature May 9, 1992, entered into force March 21, 1994
(UNFCCC), Art. 2, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
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International Energy Agency (IEA), Net Zero by 2050 (Paris: IEA, 2021), https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
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new oil and gas fields approved for development in our pathway, and no new coal mines or mine extensions
are required.“ In the next three decades, trillions of dollars in fossil fuel assets need to be stranded to achieve
climate goals, including reserves and projects that fossil and infrastructure companies have continued recklessly
to develop.

Global Energy Supply by Source (1971–2019)
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States need to push more forcefully for the transition away from fossil energy in both the climate and
investment regimes. It took 26 COPs for the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact 6 to call upon states, for the first time,
to “[accelerate] efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel
subsidies.” 7 The climate regime still needs to toughen up language on the need to accelerate the phase-out of
all fossil fuel development.

9

Similarly, states need to stop maintaining an investment protection regime that—among other flaws—does not
even try to regulate investment or to phase out high-emission investments. 8 Since 1994, states have concluded
roughly 2000 investment treaties that are still in force. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is an important one
from a climate action perspective—but not the only one. 9 All those treaties protect coal, oil, gas, and other
high-emission investments that emit well beyond the carbon budget. Even if investment treaties may not have
been intentionally designed to thwart climate goals, the fact that they have that detrimental effect can no
longer be ignored.
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“Glasgow Climate Pact,” United Nations Framework on Climate Change, Glasgow,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf.
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Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Should the European Union Fix, Leave or Kill the Energy Charter Treaty?” CCSI (blog), February 9, 2021,
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Investment Treaties and Arbitration Make Climate Action Costly and Chill Climate Regulation
10

Investment treaties and arbitration make it more costly for states to take legitimate climate action, including
the phase-out of fossil fuels and the regulation of high-emitting sectors. Under the existing investment regime,
companies are allowed to claim monetary compensation from states for policy measures that negatively affect
the companies’ interests.

11

For instance, when a government takes measures to restrict oil and gas exploration or exploitation, stop the
expansion of pipelines and other fossil fuel infrastructure, or phase out coal-fired power generation, investment
treaties and arbitration allow investors to seek compensation for those measures. 10 In other words, investment
treaties and arbitration protect and reward investments that interfere dangerously with the climate system.

12

Law firms are making sure that companies are aware of this opportunistic use of investment arbitration against
the public interest. 11 As one firm advises: “Climate change litigation […] is an opportunity […] for companies
exposed to certain climate-related government measures to vindicate their rights. Companies in industries
most affected by states’ climate change obligations (e.g., fossil fuels, mining, etc.) should audit their corporate
structure and change it, if needed, to ensure they are protected by an investment treaty. [...] It is […] important
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“Rockhopper v. Italy,” The U.S. Global Climate Change Litigation Database, http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/nonus-case/rockhopper-v-italy.
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to assess which treaty would best protect the company from any adverse climate-related government
measures.”
13

Even the possibility of climate-related investment arbitration discourages policy action. Denmark, France, and
New Zealand have openly admitted that they pushed back their deadlines to phase out oil and gas exploration
or exploitation because of investment treaties and the fear of arbitration claims. 12 There may well be other
countries that are delaying action or lowering ambition because of the investment regime, but just not
admitting it openly.

14

Fossil companies already account for almost one-fifth of investment arbitrations, and they won about three of
every four cases initiated. 13 Without fundamental reform, the investment regime will continue to allow fossil
companies to chill climate regulation and to get states (and ultimately taxpayers) to cover losses that result
from corporate recklessness.

Climate-Focused Reform Won’t Do
15

Various reform proposals aim to make investment treaties and arbitration more climate friendly, by training
arbitrators in climate science; changing how damages are calculated to avoid shifting the risk and cost of
decarbonization to states; integrating climate carve-outs, exceptions, or right-to-regulate clauses into treaties;
or allowing climate-related counterclaims by states. 14 Proponents of these reforms argue that they are steps in
the right direction, even if they are piecemeal approaches.

16

The international community should not settle for sub-optimal approaches, for three main reasons.

17

First, climate blindness is far from being the sole issue with the investment regime. Investment protection and
arbitration constrain states’ duty and right to regulate not only in the climate policy space, but also in public
health, access to public goods, protection of human rights and the environment, and the pursuit of sustainable
development. 15 States and other stakeholders have been increasingly critical of broadly worded provisions—
including the promises of fair and equitable treatment (FET) and the protection of legitimate expectations, as
well as protections against discrimination and indirect expropriation—that work against public-interest
regulation.
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18

Attempts at piecemeal reform approaches are already falling short. For example, tribunals have recently
ignored carve-outs in treaties protecting states from liability for measures taken to protect the environment. 16

19

Even more importantly, proposed reforms do nothing to address the fundamental misalignment of investment
treaties with a net-zero future, or sustainable development more generally. Third parties directly impacted by
an investment have very limited and ineffective means of participating in arbitration proceedings. 17 Some states
are paying enormous sums (in some cases equal to or more than their annual health or education budgets, for
example) to compensate investors according to a skewed and inconsistent system of valuation and
compensation. 18 The vast majority of attempts by states to avoid dispute settlement through the development
of investment facilitation centers or dispute prevention mechanisms only enhance the power investors hold
over regulators. 19 Private financiers are encouraging investors to bring claims against states by funding
claimants in return for a portion of the award. 20 Although the member states of Working Group III of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have identified various problematic aspects of
investment arbitration, 21 options being considered, such as the proposed standing multilateral mechanism, risk
further entrenching states in an already broken dispute-resolution system, without addressing the underlying
issues. 22
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Policymakers, civil society, and academics are increasingly reaching the conclusion that the existing investment
protection and arbitration regime is broken beyond repair.
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Second, there is inconclusive evidence to support that investment treaties and arbitration can perform on their
key expected benefits. 23 Existing treaties neither increase the quantity or quality of foreign direct investment
(FDI), depoliticize conflicts between home and host countries of investment, promote good governance reform,
nor strengthen the rule of law. If a regime cannot achieve its main purposes, and its costs substantially outweigh
its uncertain benefits, why put so much effort into fixing it?
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Third, it is irresponsible vis-à-vis present and future generations to keep in place a knowingly flawed regime,
with uncertain benefits and great known costs, in hopes that tweaking it at the margins will cause the necessary
fundamental change. 24 Given the global climate emergency, too much is at stake.

Overhauling Investment Protection and Arbitration in Favor of Investment Governance
23

The optimal, most effective solution is to build a new international investment regime to help achieve global
goals, advancing the types of investments that are desirable, supporting the phase-out of climate-wrecking
investments, and preserving and strengthening states’ right and duty to take climate action and other measures
in the public interest. States should move away from the existing regime, which puts profit above people and
planet, by terminating or withdrawing from existing investment protection treaties and arbitration and not
negotiating new ones that do not align with their climate and sustainable development objectives. 25

24

From a clean slate, the international community can design a regime that shapes and governs investment to
achieve climate goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Investment governance treaties could
contain guidance and commitments on governing investment in line with the SDGs, including climate action;
establish cooperation mechanisms to address challenges in the governance of international investment,
including with respect to intellectual property, technology transfer, and data; and support domestic
administrative and judicial systems to facilitate investment governance and enforcement. Importantly, the
regime could foster international cooperation, research and development (R&D), and financing mechanisms
for climate-aligned investments, including in energy efficiency, renewable electricity, green hydrogen,
batteries, recycling, and climate-resilient infrastructure. 26 It could also affirm states’ binding commitments to
phase out investment protections and incentives for fossil fuels and other high-emission investments; and
create climate justice and just transition mechanisms to protect the rights and interests of those affected by
zero-carbon investments.
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